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 PROCEDURAL PREDICTABILITY AND THE EMPLOYER 
AS LITIGATOR: THE SUPREME COURT’S  
2012-2013 TERM 
Scott R. Bauries∗ 
ABSTRACT 
In this contribution to the University of Louisville Law Review’s Annual 
Carl A. Warns Labor and Employment Institute issue, I examine the 
Supreme Court’s labor and employment-related decisions from the October 
Term 2012 (OT 2012).  I argue that the Court’s decisions assisted 
employers as litigators—as repeat players in the employment dispute 
resolution system—in two ways.  First, the Court established simple 
contract drafting strategies that employers may use to limit their exposure to 
employment claims.  Second, the Court adopted bright-line interpretations 
of employment statutes.  Both forms of assistance served a formalist 
interest in what I term “procedural predictability”—enhanced employer 
predictability and control of both the duration and costs of resolving 
employment disputes.   
I. INTRODUCTION 
In each year of the Roberts Court’s tenure, at least one labor and 
employment law scholar has analyzed the Court’s treatment of its labor and 
employment-related cases.1  Recent reviews of the Roberts Court’s work 
                                                                                                                           
 
 ∗  Robert G. Lawson Associate Professor of Law, University of Kentucky.  I would like to thank 
the organizers of the 30th Annual Carl A. Warns, Jr. Labor & Employment Institute, hosted by the Louis 
D. Brandeis School of Law at the University of Louisville for inviting me to speak in June 2013, and the 
editors of the University of Louisville Law Review for inviting me to contribute to this issue.     
 1  See Mark W. Bennett, Review of Labor and Employment Law Decisions from the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s 2011-2012 Term, 28 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 169 (2013); Christine Cooper, Employment 
Cases from the 2006-2007 Supreme Court Term, 23 LAB. LAW. 223 (2008); Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt & 
Todd Dvorak, Review of Labor and Employment Decisions from the United States Supreme Court’s 
2008-2009 Term, 25 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 107 (2010); Melissa Hart, Business-Like: The Supreme 
Court’s 2009-2010 Labor and Employment Decisions, 14 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 207 (2010); L. 
Camille Hébert, The Supreme Court’s 2011-2012 Labor and Employment Law Decisions: From the 
Controversial to the Peripheral, 16 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 287 (2012); L. Camille Hébert, The 
Supreme Court’s 2010-2011 Labor and Employment Law Decisions: A Large and “Mixed Bag” for 
Employers and Employees, 15 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 279 (2011); Robert J. Rabin, A Review of the 
Supreme Court’s Labor and Employment Law Decisions: 2005-2006 Term, 22 LAB. LAW. 115 (2006); 
Charles A. Shanor, Employment Cases from the 2007-2008 Supreme Court Term, 24 LAB. LAW. 147 
(2008).  Chief Justice John Roberts joined the Court, replacing Chief Justice William Rehnquist, during 
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have focused often on the Court’s ideological or political preferences, as 
revealed in the outcomes of its cases.2  But, as Professor Matt Bodie points 
out, in labor and employment cases, the expected ideological alignments 
often do not materialize.3  Moreover, a focus on which party was favored in 
the Court’s ultimate disposition of a case may mask information that is 
more useful in understanding the Court’s work—particularly which parties’ 
interests were ultimately served by a decision, regardless of who prevailed 
in the case before the Court. 
A “liberal” ruling can achieve a “conservative” victory, as we saw 
recently with the Court’s ruling in National Federation of Independent 
Business v. Sebelius.4  In that case, President Barack Obama’s signature 
health care overhaul, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
(Affordable Care Act)5 was upheld 5–4, but along the way to that ruling, the 
operative opinion adopted a principle of Commerce Clause jurisprudence 
that decidedly favored a more limited reach for the federal government—
that the Commerce Clause, even read in light of the Necessary and Proper 
Clause, may not be used to compel participation in a particular commercial 
market.6  What is within the state police power for regulating intrastate 
commerce is therefore outside the federal commerce power,7 but not 
because the particular market for health insurance is not an “interstate” one 
or because selling health insurance is not “commerce”8—rather, because the 
mechanism used compels, rather than prohibits or limits, conduct within the 
market.9   
A researcher interested in “case outcomes” might code the Sebelius 
case as a “liberal” victory, as the ultimate result was to uphold the 
Affordable Care Act (the signature legislative accomplishment of a 
                                                                                                                           
the 2005-2006 term.  Biographies of Current Justices of the Supreme Court, SUPREME COURT OF THE 
UNITED STATES, http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/biographies.aspx (last visited May 5, 2014).  
 2  See, e.g., Cooper, supra note 1; Shanor, supra note 1. 
 3  See Matthew T. Bodie, The Roberts Court and the Law of Human Resources, 34 BERKELEY J. 
EMP. & LAB. L. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 57), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.c 
fm?abstract_id=2273843; see also, e.g., Shanor, supra note 1, at 149 (expressing surprise at the 
unexpected lineups of justices in each case in the 2007-2008 term, particularly at Justice Scalia 
dissenting to an opinion favoring the employer).   
 4  Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).   
 5  Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010). 
 6  See Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2593. 
 7  It is clear that states may compel their residents to participate in commerce.  See, e.g., KY. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 304.39-080(5) (West, Westlaw through 2013 Reg. Sess. & 2013 Extra. Sess.) (requiring 
the purchase of liability and minimal property damage insurance as a condition of operating a motor 
vehicle in Kentucky).   
 8  See Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2591. 
 9  See id.  Although the dissenting Justices emphatically declined to join Chief Justice Roberts’s 
operative opinion on the point, it is clear from the dissent that they would support the application of the 
Chief Justice’s Commerce Clause rule in a subsequent case.  See id. at 2644–48 (Scalia, J., dissenting).   
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Democratic president) as a valid exercise of Congress’s taxation power.10  
But a more nuanced look at the case reveals that it was as much a long-term 
victory for conservative proponents of a limited federal government as it 
was an immediate victory for liberal proponents of universal health 
coverage.11  In short, focusing on which side wins or loses a case before the 
Court has the potential to mask who really “wins” as a result of the Court’s 
decision.  This latter sense of “wins” refers to the legal actors who 
ultimately benefit as a result of the principles of law that govern such a 
decision, rather than the immediate resolution of the case itself.  In this 
sense, just as a “liberal” outcome can mask a “conservative” victory, a 
particular case outcome favoring an employee can mask an overall victory 
for employers, and vice versa.   
Employers are repeat players in the system of employment dispute 
resolution.12  Unlike the average employee, who may become involved in a 
formal employment dispute that matures into a lawsuit or arbitration once in 
a career, if at all, employers frequently find themselves in court or in 
arbitration in disputes with their employees.13  As repeat players, employers 
have an interest in seeing the law of employment develop in two ways.  
First, for obvious reasons, employers have an interest in the adoption of 
narrow or restrictive interpretations of the civil rights statutes, which lessen 
the duties they owe to their employees.  Second, and perhaps less 
obviously, employers have an interest in the adoption of bright-line rules of 
decision in employment cases.  Such rules allow employers to predict more 
accurately the resolution of particular cases, which allows them to predict 
the likely duration of each dispute, as well as the costs of resolution, 
including settlement costs.   
Narrow interpretations of the statutes’ coverage or the duties they 
impose in the workplace are often difficult to sell politically and judicially, 
as evidenced by the Court’s expansive recent interpretation of the retaliation 
                                                                                                                           
 
 10  There are numerous such studies.  See, e.g., Bryan D. Lammon, What We Talk About When We 
Talk About Ideology: Judicial Politics Scholarship and Naive Legal Realism, 83 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 
231, 236 n.15 (2009) (collecting studies).  Even studies assessing influences beyond political ideology 
fall victim to this focus on ultimate winners and losers of the instant case—as they must, given the 
constraints of empirical coding.  See, e.g., Frank B. Cross & Blake J. Nelson, Strategic Institutional 
Effects on Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1437 (2001) (a careful and rigorous study 
that attempts to account for several interrelated influences on judging but limits its analysis to the 
winners and losers of particular cases).   
 11  See, e.g., Nicole Huberfeld et al., Plunging into Endless Difficulties: Medicaid and Coercion in 
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1, 47–50 (2013) (arguing that 
the decision is a continuation of the Rehnquist Court’s focus on federalism as a constitutional principle).   
 12  Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, 1 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 189, 
190 (1997). 
 13  Id. 
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provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to cover those who have not 
themselves engaged in protected activity, but who are closely related to 
employees who have engaged in protected activity.14  But bright-line rules 
of decision relating to the proof of employment claims are just as valuable, 
and seemingly more palatable to some of the Justices.  A bright-line rule of 
decision may not absolve private employers of their duty not to 
discriminate, or even limit this duty in any way, but such a rule can make 
the litigation of employment claims much more predictable—and therefore 
much less expensive—for employers.  
This Article will demonstrate that the OT 2012 cases (with one 
exception) established bright-line rules of decision that increased the 
predictability of the duration and costs of resolving employment disputes—
what I term “procedural predictability.”  This pursuit of procedural 
predictability served the interests of employers as repeat players in the 
employment dispute resolution system by making that system much more 
manageable at earlier stages than it was previously.  I argue that, in the OT 
2012 cases, the Court assisted employers as litigators in two primary ways.  
First, the Court established formalistic, bright-line rules of decision for 
contract disputes touching and concerning the workplace.15  These rules of 
decision signal to employers the drafting strategies that they may adopt to 
lessen their costs and time spent resolving employment disputes.  Second, 
the Court adopted formalistic, bright-line rules of decision for employment 
claims based on civil rights statutes.16  These rules will have the effect of 
affording employers more control over statutory disputes at the early stages 
of each case—thus lessening their costs and time expended.  Importantly, 
these mechanisms operated regardless of whether the employer-side party 
won each individual case before the Court. 
I begin by examining each of the cases that can plausibly be considered 
a “labor and employment case” on the OT 2012 docket.  Then, I show that 
the principles of law laid down in each of the cases—regardless of which 
party came out victorious before the Court—greatly favored employers as 
repeat players, and generally did so by pursuing greater procedural 
predictability for employers.  I conclude with some preliminary thoughts as 
to the Court’s pursuit of procedural predictability as a goal in its decision 
making.   
                                                                                                                           
 
 14  See Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, 131 S. Ct. 863, 867, 870 (2011) (unanimously interpreting 
the Act to extend to the fiancé of the employee who engaged in protected activity, though the employee 
who engaged in protected activity did not make a retaliation claim herself).   
 15  See infra Part III.A. 
 16  See infra Part III.B. 
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II. THE OT 2012 LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT CASES 
The OT 2012 docket contained very few cases that can properly be 
termed “labor and employment law cases.”  The Court did not consider any 
labor law cases, and its pure employment law cases—those involving 
principles unique to the employment context—could be counted on one 
hand.  The total of eight Supreme Court decisions at least touching and 
concerning labor and employment can be usefully divided into two strands.  
The first strand contains the Court’s contract cases.17  These cases involved 
employee benefits plans under the Employee Retirement Income Security 
Act (ERISA) or arbitration contracts, which have long been important to 
labor law and are increasing in their importance to employment law.  The 
second strand contains the Court’s statutory interpretation cases.18  These 
cases involved interpretations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
(Title VII), the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), and the Civil Service 
Reform Act (CSRA).  I consider the four contract cases before moving on 
to the four statutory interpretation cases.   
A. The Contract Cases 
The law of arbitration applies trans-substantively.19  That is, the case 
law developed under the Federal Arbitration Act20 applies regardless of the 
substance of the underlying dispute that might be arbitrated.21  Because a 
good deal of both employment and labor dispute resolution now involves 
arbitration, the law of arbitration is very important to employment and labor 
law, and the Supreme Court’s three arbitration decisions in OT 2012 will all 
have effects on the resolution of workplace disputes.   
It is plausible to claim that, in enforcing what it calls “a liberal federal 
policy favoring arbitration,”22 the Supreme Court has developed a unique 
                                                                                                                           
 
 17  Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013); Oxford Health Plans L.L.C. v. 
Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064 (2013); US Airways, Inc. v. McCutchen, 133 S. Ct. 1537 (2013); Nitro-Lift 
Techs., L.L.C. v. Howard, 133 S. Ct. 500 (2012). 
 18  Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013); Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. 
Ct. 2434 (2013); Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 133 S. Ct. 1523 (2013); Kloeckner v. Solis, 133 
S. Ct. 596 (2012). 
 19  Cf. Michael J. Yelnosky, Fully Federalizing the Federal Arbitration Act, 90 OR. L. REV. 729, 
770 (2012) (calling for a thicker body of federal common law including contract defenses to stabilize 
this area of law).   
 20  Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–14 (2012). 
 21  Yelnosky, supra note 19, at 731.   
 22  AT&T Mobility L.L.C. v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1745 (2011) (quoting Moses H. Cone 
Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)).   
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branch of contract law as federal common law.23  This body of contract 
doctrine has steadily developed over time to ensure that parties seeking to 
compel arbitration of their disputes, including employers, are able to access 
arbitration with less and less trouble.  In developing the law in this way, the 
Court has protected the long-term interests of employers as repeat players in 
the employment dispute resolution system, and has done so by making both 
the duration and the costs of employment disputes more predictable for 
employers.  The three arbitration cases the Court decided in the most recent 
term are no exception to these principles.   
The first of these three cases that I will discuss is Oxford Health Plans, 
LLC v. Sutter,24 decided on June 10, 2013.  Sutter arose out of an 
employment arbitration, but the question to be decided was one of general 
arbitration law, not a question of employment law as a unique doctrinal 
area.25  The case had as its background the Court’s recent decision in Stolt-
Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp.,26 holding that class 
arbitration is only available if the parties have specifically agreed to it in the 
arbitration agreement.27  The plaintiff in Sutter requested class treatment 
from the arbitrator, but the contract was silent as to whether the parties 
agreed to allow such treatment.28  Nevertheless, the arbitrator interpreted 
the contract to allow for class treatment.29  Thus, the question for the Court 
became whether Stolt-Nielsen required explicit, textual agreement or simply 
an agreement discoverable through contract interpretation, and if the latter, 
under what circumstances such an interpretation might be reversed on 
further review.30   
Oxford Health’s argument in the Supreme Court was that Stolt-Nielsen 
required an explicit, textual agreement.31  The Court, however, unanimously 
agreed with Sutter and the arbitrator to the contrary.32  Citing the Court’s 
longstanding practice of recognizing the power of the arbitrator to interpret 
the arbitration agreement, and deferring substantially to such interpretive 
decisions,33 the Court held that the arbitrator’s decision that the parties had 
agreed to class arbitration was not arbitrary or capricious.34  The Court 
                                                                                                                           
 
 23  See Yelnosky, supra note 19, at 730–34.   
 24  Oxford Health Plans L.L.C. v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064 (2013). 
 25  Id. at 2068. 
 26  Stolt-Nielsen S. A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 559 U.S. 662 (2010). 
 27  Id. at 687.  
 28  Sutter, 133 S. Ct. at 2067. 
 29  Id. 
 30  Id. at 2068. 
 31  Id. at 2069. 
 32  Id. at 2066, 2070. 
 33  Id. at 2070–71. 
 34  Id. at 2071. 
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distinguished Stolt-Nielsen on the basis that the parties to that case had 
stipulated their failure to reach agreement as to class arbitration,35 whereas 
the Sutter parties contested whether they had reached agreement,36 thus 
leaving it to the arbitrator to resolve the point through interpretation.37   
Another OT 2012 arbitration case that affected employment, while 
having neither employers nor employees as parties in those capacities, is 
American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant.38  In Italian Colors, a 
credit card company included a prohibition against class arbitration 
explicitly in the agreement it entered with the users of its services.39  Italian 
Colors Restaurant and other merchants that accepted American Express 
charge and credit cards in their establishments sued American Express for 
using its market power in the area of “charge cards” to force merchants to 
accept unfavorable terms governing “credit card” transactions.40  The 
merchants claimed that this use of market power constituted a “tying” 
arrangement and was therefore a violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act.41  
They also sought to proceed as a class, despite the language of the identical 
(in all relevant respects) agreement that each signed with American Express 
explicitly prohibiting class treatment.42   
The merchants contended that enforcement of the arbitration 
prohibition in the agreement would have the impermissible effect of 
preventing “‘effective vindication’ of a federal statutory right.”43  The 
merchants argued that preventing class arbitration of relatively small 
antitrust claims would place a substantial disincentive on litigating these 
claims at all, given their small individual values and the marginal costs of 
litigation.44  Essentially, their contention was that the expense of litigating 
even a simple antitrust claim, including the costs of proving that claim 
                                                                                                                           
 
 35  Id. at 2069–70. 
 36  Id. at 2070. 
 37  Id. 
 38  Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013). 
 39  Id. at 2308 (“The agreement also provides that ‘[t]here shall be no right or authority for any Claims to be 
arbitrated on a class action basis.’” (quoting In re Am Express Merchs. Litig., 667 F.3d 204, 209 (2d Cir. 2012))). 
 40  Id.  Charge cards are less common than credit cards.  See In re Am. Express Merchs. Litig., 667 F.3d at 
207–08, rev'd sub nom. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013). The basic difference 
between the two is that the former does not allow a borrower to carry a balance from month to month.  Italian 
Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2308 n.1.  American Express has long been one of the most dominant charge card 
companies in the world.  See id. at 2308. 
 41  Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2308; see Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2012).  A 
“tying” arrangement essentially forces those who want one product to also purchase another product, or 
to purchase it on less favorable terms than would be offered if the purchase of the more desirable 
product were not “tied” to its purchase.  See In re Am. Express Merchs. Litig., 667 F.3d at 208 n.4. 
 42  Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2308. 
 43  Id. at 2310.   
 44  Id. 
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through economic expert witness testimony, would prevent the litigation of 
any such simple claim from being economically beneficial to the plaintiff, 
even if victorious.45  But the Court rejected this contention as a basis for 
voiding the anti-class provision.46   
The majority read the “effective vindication” exception as a narrow 
prohibition on the enforcement of class arbitration waivers where such 
waivers remove a party’s “right to pursue” a statutory violation completely, 
such as where a class arbitration waiver contains an explicit, prospective 
waiver of the statutory right itself, or imposes a confiscatory fee for the 
arbitration.47  In the case before the Court, none of the parties would have 
been completely prevented from “pursuing” their claims—it just would not 
make economic sense for them to do so.48  Accordingly, the “effective 
vindication” exception was inapplicable.49   
The final arbitration case, Nitro-Lift Technologies, L.L.C. v. Howard,50 
like Sutter, arose out of the employment context—this time in relation to a 
post-employment non-competition agreement.51  Nitro-Lift, unlike the other 
cases reviewed here, was a short, unanimous, per curiam opinion.52  The 
case presented a dispute between a service provider to oil and gas well 
operators operating in Oklahoma, Texas, and Arkansas and two 
employees.53  Both employees had signed employment agreements with 
Nitro-Lift that prevented them from working for competitors of Nitro-Lift 
for a period of time after their separation from employment with Nitro-
Lift.54  Despite the agreements, both employees resigned from Nitro-Lift 
and went to work for one of its competitors shortly thereafter.55   
Soon after learning of their new employment, Nitro-Lift served both 
former employees with demands for arbitration.56  In response, the 
employees filed their own suit in state court in Oklahoma, seeking a judicial 
declaration that their employment agreements were invalid and 
unenforceable.57  The trial court dismissed, citing the arbitration clause, but 
                                                                                                                           
 
 45  Id. at 2308. 
 46  Id. at 2310.   
 47  Id. at 2310–11 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 
n.19 (1985)).   
 48  Id. at 2310. 
 49  Id. 
 50  Nitro-Lift Techs., L.L.C. v. Howard, 133 S. Ct. 500 (2012). 
 51  Id. at 501–02. 
 52  Id. at 501. 
 53  Id. at 501–02. 
 54  Id. 
 55  Id. at 502. 
 56  Id. 
 57  Id. 
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the Oklahoma Supreme Court reversed, holding that the existence of an 
arbitration clause in a non-competition agreement cannot deprive the state’s 
courts from deciding whether the agreement comports with the public 
policy of the state.58  The court went on to hold that both agreements were 
void as against the public policy of Oklahoma.59   
Nitro-Lift appealed the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s ruling to the 
Supreme Court, which unanimously vacated the court’s decision in a per 
curiam opinion.60  Citing Preston v. Ferrer,61 the Court applied the 
established rule that, while challenges to the enforceability of a specific 
provision mandating arbitration must be decided by a court, challenges to 
the enforceability of the overall agreement itself must be decided by the 
arbitrator.62  The challenge in Nitro-Lift was to the enforceability of the 
non-competition restrictions, not the arbitration provision itself.63  Thus, the 
Court rejected any “public policy” exception to the “arbitrator decides” 
rule.64  
ERISA65 has provided the Court with opportunities to engage both its 
statutory interpretation function and its pure federal common lawmaking 
function.  Over time, the Court has developed a common law jurisprudence 
of both contract law and general equity law as a way of implementing the 
requirements of ERISA.  OT 2012 provided the Court with an opportunity 
to clarify the extent to which the Court will allow equitable doctrines to 
affect the enforcement of the sorts of contracts falling under ERISA’s 
preemptive umbrella—employee benefit plans.     
In US Airways v. McCutchen,66 the plaintiff, McCutchen, was injured 
and secured health benefits in the amount of $66,866 through his 
employer’s benefits plan (the Plan), which was covered by ERISA.67  
McCutchen then sued the third party who injured him, recovering 
$110,000.68  After attorneys’ fees and costs, the plaintiff was left with 
                                                                                                                           
 
 58  Id. (quoting Howard v. Nitro-Lift Techs., L.L.C., 273 P.3d 20, 26 n.20, 27 (Okla. 2011), vacated, 133 S. 
Ct. 500 (2012)). 
 59  Id. 
 60  Id. at 501. 
 61  Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 353–54 (2008) (holding that challenges to the validity of a 
contract containing an arbitration agreement must be heard by the arbitrator); see also Prima Paint Corp. 
v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403–404 (1967) (establishing the same rule for cases filed 
in federal courts).  
 62  Nitro-Lift, 133 S. Ct. at 503.   
 63  Id. at 502. 
 64  Id. at 503. 
 65  Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461 (2012).   
 66  U.S. Airways, Inc. v. McCutchen, 133 S. Ct. 1537 (2013). 
 67  Id. at 1543. 
 68  Id. 
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$66,000—$866 less than the Plan had paid out in benefits.69  Under the 
clear terms of the ERISA Plan, if an injured employee were to sue the third 
party and recover more than the Plan expended for his care, the Plan was 
entitled to recover all of its expenses from the injured employee, regardless 
of the employee’s ultimate net recovery after paying attorneys’ fees and 
costs.70  As the Court stated, this provision imposed an “equitable lien by 
agreement” on the lawsuit proceeds, so the scope of the lien was best 
determined by the language of the agreement, in this case, the ERISA 
Plan.71  The Court’s resolution first applied the clear terms of the Plan to 
award the Plan all of its expenses ($866 of which had to come out of 
McCutchen’s pocket).72  That portion of the opinion was unanimous.73   
But a 5–4 majority also found that the plan was “silent” as to how 
attorneys’ fees and costs were to be split among the parties in the event of a 
third party suit and recovery.74  This silence required the Court to interpret 
the Plan in light of the equitable nature of the lien by agreement,75 and the 
majority applied the “common fund” doctrine familiar to trust law to 
allocate the costs of recovery proportionally.76  Four justices dissented on 
this point, explaining that the case had come to the Court on the parties’ 
mutual stipulation that the terms of the plan were “unambiguous,” and that 
it was therefore an overreach to apply any doctrines of interpretation, 
including the common fund doctrine.77   
B. The Statutory Interpretation Cases 
The remaining four cases on the OT 2012 docket were statutory 
interpretation cases (though one of them involved no interpretation at all).78  
Two of these cases dealt with the proof requirements for violations of Title 
VII, while the other two considered issues relating to subject matter 
jurisdiction under the FLSA and the CSRA.   
                                                                                                                           
 
 69  Id. 
 70  Id. 
 71  Id. at 1546.   
 72  Id. at 1548.   
 73  See id. at 1551 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating the dissenters’ agreement with Parts I and II but 
disagreement with Parts III and IV). 
 74  Id. at 1543 (majority opinion).  Under the common fund doctrine, “someone ‘who recovers a common 
fund for the benefit of persons other than himself’ is due ‘a reasonable attorney’s fee from the fund as whole.’”  
Id. at 1550 (quoting Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 478 (1980)).   
 75  Id. at 1549. 
 76  Id. at 1550–51.   
 77  Id. at 1551 (Scalia, J., dissenting).   
 78  See infra notes 162–188 and accompanying text (discussing Kloeckner v. Solis, 133 S. Ct. 596 
(2012)).   
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To begin, the Court decided two cases under Title VII,79 one involving 
a federal judge-made affirmative defense and the other involving a standard 
of causation.  The first, Vance v. Ball State University,80 asked the Court to 
determine whether a plaintiff’s co-worker who had some authority to assign 
tasks to the plaintiff and otherwise direct her work activities qualified as a 
“supervisor” for the purposes of the Faragher-Ellerth81 affirmative defense 
to a hostile work environment claim under Title VII.82  The second, 
University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar,83 asked the 
Court to decide whether the “mixed motive” framework of causation 
initially developed in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,84 and later codified in 
the Civil Rights Act of 1991,85 could be applied to a retaliation claim under 
Title VII.86   
Maetta Vance, a cafeteria employee at Ball State University, alleged 
that another cafeteria worker named Saundra Davis had harassed her based 
on her race.87  When the University learned of the alleged harassment 
through Vance’s complaints, it acted to resolve the matter, but the alleged 
harassment continued.88  Vance filed suit, and the District Court held, on 
cross-motions for summary judgment, that the University had acted 
reasonably in attempting to stop the behavior of Davis that constituted the 
alleged harassment.89   
The default rule of employer liability in harassment cases under Title 
VII is one of direct liability for negligence on the employer’s own part.90  
An employer is liable for harassment perpetrated by one of its employees 
only if it knows or should know of harassment and does not act promptly 
and reasonably to protect the victim of the harassment.91  So, based on the 
University’s reasonable actions in attempting to remedy the alleged 
                                                                                                                           
 
 79  Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e—2000e17 (2012). 
 80  Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434 (2013).   
 81  See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 
U.S. 742 (1998).   
 82  Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2443. 
 83  Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013). 
 84  Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).   
 85  Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2012).  
 86  Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2522–23. 
 87  Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2439.   
 88  Id. at 2440. 
 89  Id.   
 90  Katherine S. Anderson, Note, Employer Liability under Title VII for Sexual Harassment after 
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1258, 1262 & n.30 (1987).   
 91  See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(d) (1999) (“With respect to conduct between fellow employees, an 
employer is responsible for acts of sexual harassment in the workplace where the employer (or its agents 
or supervisory employees) knows or should have known of the conduct, unless it can show that it took 
immediate and appropriate corrective action.”).   
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harassment after Vance complained, the University could not be held liable 
for Davis’s allegedly harassing acts.92   
But this default rule applies only to the actions of “co-employees” of 
the plaintiff.93  Under the Faragher-Ellerth doctrine, if the alleged harasser 
is the supervisor of the alleged victim, then based on agency principles, 
vicarious liability applies.94  There is, however, a potential affirmative 
defense to such liability.95  Where harassment culminates in a “tangible 
employment action,” such as termination, there is no affirmative defense to 
it, as this is the familiar and especially pernicious form of harassment 
known as “quid pro quo” harassment, which can never be justified.96  But 
where the plaintiff complains of a hostile work environment that did not 
culminate in a tangible employment action, an employer can establish an 
affirmative defense against vicarious liability if the employer proves (1) that 
it acted reasonably to prevent and promptly remedy any harassment, and (2) 
that the employee-victim “unreasonably failed to take advantage of the 
preventive or corrective opportunities that the employer provided.”97  That 
is, the employer bears the burden of proving that its own actions were 
reasonable—both as to preventing harassing conduct and promptly 
remedying it once aware of it—and the employer must additionally prove 
that the employee acted unreasonably in reporting the alleged harassment or 
taking other steps to prevent or stop it.98   
Vance was not terminated, reassigned, or demoted, but Vance did 
contend that Davis was her supervisor, rather than a co-employee, in an 
effort to force the University to prove the Faragher-Ellerth affirmative 
defense to escape liability.99  The University disputed the claim that Davis 
was Vance’s supervisor, and that was the issue on which the Court granted 
certiorari.100  Vance contended that the Court should examine whether 
Davis was her supervisor based on the particular facts of their working 
relationship.101  Davis, at times, assigned work to Vance and directed her 
duties, thus exercising at least some managerial control over Vance.102  The 
                                                                                                                           
 
 92  Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2440. 
 93  Anderson, supra note 90, at 1262. 
 94  Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2442.  For a comparative introduction to direct and vicarious liability, see 
James Fleming, Jr., Vicarious Liability, 28 TUL. L. REV. 161 (1954).   
 95  Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2442.   
 96  See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 790 (1998); Burlington Indus., Inc., v. Ellerth, 
524 U.S. 742, 762 (1998). 
 97  Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2439 (citing Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765). 
 98  Id. 
 99  Id. at 2439–40. 
 100  Id. at 2443. 
 101  Id. at 2449. 
 102  Id. 
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Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s (EEOC’s) most recent 
interpretation of the term “supervisor” was also in accord with Vance’s 
desired approach.103   
But the Supreme Court adopted the simpler, more formalistic approach 
advanced by the University.104  Under the approach the Court adopted, the 
only inquiry a court must make in determining whether an alleged harasser 
was the supervisor of the victim is whether the alleged harasser had the 
authority “to take tangible employment actions against the victim.”105  Such 
actions might include anything that “effect[s] a ‘significant change in 
employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment 
with significantly different responsibilities, or . . . a significant change in 
benefits.”106  In Vance, the alleged harasser, Davis, had some authority to 
direct Vance’s work activities, but had no authority to hire her, fire her, 
reassign her, promote her, or change her benefits.107  Therefore, Davis was 
merely Vance’s co-employee, rather than her supervisor, eliminating the 
possibility of vicarious liability.108  And because the University acted 
reasonably to protect Vance once it was alerted to her complaints, the 
University therefore was not directly liable for any harassment that Davis 
might have committed.109   
The other Title VII case, Nassar, also involved a university 
employer.110  Nassar, a doctor at a university-affiliated hospital, complained 
to his employer that his supervisor, Dr. Beth Levine, discriminated against 
him based on his religion and his ethnic heritage.111  After lodging these 
complaints, Nassar approached the University’s partner institution, 
Parkland Memorial Hospital, about continuing to work for Parkland (under 
different supervisors) as a staff physician, while discontinuing his affiliation 
                                                                                                                           
 
 103  Id. (“In its Enforcement Guidance, the EEOC takes the position that an employee, in order to be 
classified as a supervisor, must wield authority ‘of sufficient magnitude so as to assist the harasser 
explicitly or implicitly in carrying out the harassment.’”).  Importantly, as to its Enforcement Guidance, 
the EEOC is not entitled to the normal deference associated with administrative rulemaking under 
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).  William N. 
Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency 
Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1189 (2008).  Rather, because 
Congress did not specifically authorize the EEOC to enact interpretive regulations under the relevant 
portions of Title VII, the EEOC’s interpretations are entitled only to deference under Skidmore v. Swift 
& Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944), meaning that, instead of deferring to any “reasonable” interpretation, the 
Court will only defer to “persuasive” interpretations.  Eskridge & Baer, supra. 
 104  Vance, 133 S. Ct. 2450. 
 105  Id. at 2439.   
 106  Id. at 2443 (quoting Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998)).   
 107  Id. at 2439, 2449. 
 108  Id. at 2454. 
 109  See id. 
 110  Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2523 (2013). 
 111  Id. 
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with the University of Texas as a faculty member.112  Administrators at 
Parkland allegedly assured him that this was possible.113  Though this 
assurance was not a formal job offer, Nassar resigned his position on the 
University faculty.114  Importantly, in tendering his resignation, Nassar sent 
a letter both to Levine’s supervisor, Dr. Fitz, and to some other employees 
of the University, restating his prior complaints of discrimination based on 
religion and ethnic origin.115  Thereafter, Parkland formally offered Nassar 
the job, but then revoked the offer upon learning from Dr. Fitz that such an 
arrangement would be inconsistent with the affiliation agreement between 
Parkland and the University.116  Nassar filed suit claiming that Dr. Fitz’s 
intervention leading to the revocation of the offer constituted retaliation 
against Nassar for opposing unlawful discrimination.117   
The existence of the agreement between the University and Parkland 
did in fact justify the revocation of Nassar’s offer because it required 
Parkland doctors to be members of the University’s faculty.118  But around 
the time he alerted Parkland to this feature of the agreement, Fitz had 
allegedly also stated a desire to clear Levine’s name.119  Thus, it was 
unclear whether Fitz admonished the Hospital to withdraw the offer due to 
a desire to follow the affiliation agreement strictly, or due to a desire to 
retaliate against Nassar for his complaints of discrimination.120  Because 
some evidence of each motive existed, the question presented for the Court 
was whether a retaliation claim under Title VII requires proof of “but for” 
causation, or whether it is sufficient to prove that a retaliatory motive was 
one “motivating factor” among other legitimate causes of the challenged 
decision.121   
The Court held that “but for” causation is required.122  The majority 
explained that Congress’s failure to explicitly include claims for retaliation 
within its 1991 amendment to Title VII allowing for “motivating factor” 
causation meant that the amended standard did not apply to such claims.123  
In other words, and consistent with the Court’s reading of congressional 
                                                                                                                           
 
 112  Id. at 2523–24.  
 113  Id.  
 114  Id. at 2524. 
 115  Id.  
 116  Id. 
 117  Id.; see also Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2012) (making 
actionable retaliation against an employee for opposing unlawful discrimination).   
 118  See Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2523. 
 119  Id. at 2524. 
 120  See id. at 2523–24. 
 121  Id. at 2522–23. 
 122  Id. at 2534.   
 123  Id. at 2529. 
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intent in the recent age discrimination case of Gross v. FBL Financial 
Services Inc.,124 the decision of Congress to direct the “motivating factor” 
language in the 1991 amendment to Title VII at unlawful employment 
practices involving discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, and 
national origin, without mentioning retaliation, evidenced congressional 
intent to exclude retaliation claims from the new “motivating factor” 
standard.125   
The Court also read the promulgation of the 1991 amendments as 
inconsistent with the continued application of Price Waterhouse outside the 
unlawful employment practices that are the subject of the 1991 
amendments.126  In the majority’s view, Congress’s decision to amend the 
statute specifically to adopt in part and alter in part the Price Waterhouse 
framework was a sufficient indication of its intent to displace the federal 
common law framework with a statutory one, and the limits of that statutory 
framework should be determined based on the statute.127  Thus, the “mixed 
motive” framework is now limited solely to the status-based discrimination 
prohibitions found in Title VII.128   
The Court also decided two cases in which it formulated decision rules 
relating to subject matter jurisdiction under the federal employment 
statutes.  Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk,129 the first of these two 
cases, presented a question of mootness under the collective action 
provisions of the FLSA.130  The case involved the increasingly common 
practice of using full settlement of an individual claim to “pick off” the 
named plaintiff in a putative collective action under the FLSA to prevent 
the certification of the collective action.131  Laura Symczyk sued her 
employer under the FLSA seeking to recover for deductions of break time 
from her pay even though she was sometimes required to work during her 
break.132  She made her claim on behalf of herself, as well as on behalf of 
others similarly situated, thus making the claim a putative collective 
action.133   
                                                                                                                           
 
 124  Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., 557 U.S. 167 (2009).   
 125  Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2529.   
 126  Id. at 2534.   
 127  Id. 
 128  See id. 
 129  Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 133 S. Ct. 1523 (2013). 
 130  Id. at 1526; see also Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2012).   
 131  Symczyk, 133 S. Ct. at 1527; see also 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (providing for collective actions, and 
requiring that the non-named plaintiffs opt into the class, as opposed to forming the class through a 
certification ruling by the judge and allowing non-named plaintiffs to opt out, as would be the case 
under a typical class action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3)).   
 132  Symczyk, 133 S. Ct. at 1527.   
 133  Id. 
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Under the more conventionally familiar procedures of the Rule 23(b)(3) 
consumer class action, a plaintiff representative is required to procure the 
court’s approval to certify the class, and then is required to provide each 
member of the class with notice of the action and of the member’s right to 
opt out of the class and pursue relief individually.134  The collective action 
provisions of the FLSA, in contrast, require that any non-named plaintiff 
wishing to participate in a collective action affirmatively file a notice opting 
into the plaintiff class, meaning that no class exists until at least one 
employee other than the plaintiff has opted in.135  At the time that Symczyk 
filed her suit, no other employee had opted into the action.136  The addition 
of even one absent employee to the suit through her filing of an affirmative 
notice opting into the suit would have allowed at least a putative class to 
form.137  But before any of Symczyk’s co-employees could opt into the 
class, the employer presented Symczyk with a Rule 68 Offer of Judgment (a 
formal settlement offer).138  The employer offered Symczyk all of the relief 
to which she claimed to be entitled in exchange for dropping the suit.139  
However, the employer’s offer, on its own terms, expired ten days later 
when Symczyk failed to accept or reject it.140   
Ordinarily, this failure to accept the offer should have placed Symczyk 
in the same position as she would have been in if the offer had not been 
made, other than exposing her to potential penalties under Rule 68.141  
Nevertheless, in the district court, Symczyk conceded that her failure to 
accept the settlement offer rendered her individual claim moot.142  On 
appeal, the Third Circuit affirmatively ruled, based on circuit precedent, 
that Symczyk’s claim was mooted by the expired offer.143  In the Supreme 
Court, however, Symczyk did not file a cross-petition on the issue.144  
Based on these acts of waiver (in the district court) and abandonment (in the 
Response to the Petitioner’s Brief), the majority assumed the mootness of 
Symczyk’s individual claim, and isolated the issue to one of “whether [a 
                                                                                                                           
 
 134  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).   
 135  29 U.S.C. § 216(b).   
 136  Symczyk, 133 S. Ct. at 1527. 
 137  See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 
 138  Symczyk, 133 S. Ct. at 1527; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 68.   
 139  Symczyk, 133 S. Ct. at 1527. 
 140  Id. 
 141  See FED. R. CIV. P. 68(d) (“If the judgment that the offeree finally obtains is not more favorable 
than the unaccepted offer, the offeree must pay the costs incurred after the offer was made.”).   
 142  Smczyk, 133 S. Ct. at 1529. 
 143  Id.    
 144  Id.  
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putative collective action under the FLSA] is justiciable when the lone 
plaintiff’s individual claim becomes moot.”145   
The Court held that the collective action cannot proceed under such 
circumstances.146  Important to this resolution was the fact that, at the time 
of the offer’s expiration, no other employee had yet opted to become part of 
the suit.147  Taking Symczyk’s individual claim as moot, then, the Court 
distinguished FLSA collective actions, in which no class has any legal 
significance until an absent employee affirmatively opts into the class, from 
traditional Rule 23(b)(3) class actions, in which the class’s interests acquire 
independent legal significance as soon as certification is granted.148  Given 
the lack of independent legal significance of the collective interests of 
Symczyk’s absent co-workers, the Court held that Symczyk lacked a 
personal stake in the controversy tied to litigating on behalf of them.149  
Therefore, since her own individual claim was moot, the suit no longer 
presented a live case or controversy.150  
The other subject matter jurisdiction case was much simpler.  Kloeckner 
v. Solis151 presented only an issue of original subject matter jurisdiction 
under the CSRA,152 and it therefore will affect only the initial decision of 
where to file a lawsuit against a federal government employer, rather than 
any substantive decision governing actions in the federal workplace or any 
procedural decision of how to proceed in or prove an employment case after 
filing.153  Moreover, the issue of original subject matter jurisdiction the 
Court resolved in the case only affects appeals from decisions of the Merit 
Systems Protection Board (MSPB) in what are termed “mixed cases,” and 
only the subset of those cases that the MSPB dismisses on procedural 
grounds.154  The Court in Kloeckner merely applied the very clear text of 
the CSRA, rejecting an alternative reading that would have found a non-
textual exception, so the Court did not really even formulate a decision rule 
in the case through interpretation.155  Thus, in the grand scheme of the 
Court’s employment law docket, it was, at best, a minor decision.  
                                                                                                                           
 
 145  Id. at 1526.    
 146  See id. at 1529.   
 147  Id. 
 148  Id. at 1530. 
 149  Id. at 1530–32. 
 150  Id. at 1532. 
 151  Kloeckner v. Solis, 133 S. Ct. 596 (2012).  
 152  Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1105 (2012). 
 153  See Kloeckner, 133 S. Ct. at 604. 
 154  Id. at 601–02. 
 155  Id. at 603–04. 
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Nevertheless, it was a decision of the Court in the most recent term, so it 
belongs among the cases reviewed here.   
Carolyn Kloeckner, an employee of the federal Department of Labor 
(DOL), filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC, claiming that she 
had been subjected to a hostile work environment based on her sex and 
age.156  At the time she filed her suit, her case did not fall under the 
jurisdiction of the MSPB, the administrative entity responsible for 
adjudicating the claims of federal employees subjected to serious 
employment actions, such as demotion or termination.157  Shortly thereafter, 
however, the DOL terminated her employment.158   
This termination was for cause, and was therefore subject to the review 
of the MSPB.159  However, in addition to her challenge of the cause 
determination, Kloeckner claimed that she had been terminated based on 
her sex, age, or both.160  The combination of these two arguments made the 
case a “mixed case”—one that involves both the cause-based protections of 
the CSRA and the status-based protections of Title VII.161  At this point, 
Kloeckner had a choice: she could continue with her prior EEOC charge as 
to the alleged hostile work environment and simultaneously pursue her 
MSPB mixed case, or she could litigate them one at a time.162   
To conserve her discovery expenses, Kloeckner opted to pursue the 
EEOC charge first.163  She requested leave to amend her EEOC charge to 
include her discriminatory termination claim, and she asked the MSPB to 
dismiss her case without prejudice for four months to allow that process to 
come to a resolution.164  Both requests were granted.165  The MSPB 
dismissed her mixed case without prejudice to her ability to re-file by the 
earlier of January 18, 2007, or 30 days after a final decision in her EEOC 
case.166   
Kloeckner’s EEOC case was not resolved until long after her January 
18, 2007 deadline, when the EEOC administrative law judge dismissed her 
                                                                                                                           
 
 156  Id. at 602.  For the general procedures for filing such claims, see 29 C.F.R. §§ 1614.105–.106 
(2009).   
 157  Kloeckner, 133 S. Ct. at 602.   
 158  Id. 
 159  Id.; see 5 U.S.C. § 1221(a) (2012) (providing for MSPB review of tangible employment actions 
involving job performance).   
 160  Kloeckner, 133 S. Ct. at 602.  
 161  Id.; see Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012) (prohibiting 
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, and national origin).    
 162  Kloeckner, 133 S. Ct. at 602. 
 163  Id. 
 164  Id. 
 165  Id. 
 166  Id.   
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case as a sanction for bad-faith discovery conduct and remanded it to the 
DOL for a final decision.167  Once that decision was issued, Kloeckner 
sought review before the MSPB.168  But the MSPB treated Kloeckner’s 
appeal as an improper attempt to re-open her earlier mixed case long after 
her right to re-file had expired and dismissed it as untimely.169  Kloeckner 
then filed suit in the District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, but 
the court dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding 
that Kloekner was required to file her suit initially in the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, pursuant to the MSPB review 
provisions of the CSRA.170   
The CSRA provides for two avenues of review for a MSPB 
determination.171  The first applies to general decisions of the MSPB 
reviewing tangible employment actions.172  This avenue requires that an 
action seeking review of the MSPB’s determination be filed directly in the 
Federal Circuit.173  However, the relevant exception to this general rule 
requires that, where a federal employee brings a mixed case, that employee 
must seek review of the MSPB’s determination initially in the local federal 
district court.174   
The Government (as employer) contended that, despite the clear 
exception to the Federal Circuit filing requirement for mixed cases, 
Kloeckner was required to file initially in the Federal Circuit because the 
MSPB had dismissed her appeal for procedural reasons, rather than on the 
merits.175  The Court unanimously rejected this contention based on the 
complete absence of any language in the statute drawing such a 
distinction.176  Ultimately, this decision may have made it marginally more 
expensive for federal employers to litigate mixed cases rejected by the 
                                                                                                                           
 
 167  Id. at 602–03.    
 168  Id. at 603. 
 169  Id.   
 170  Id.; see also Kloeckner v. Solis, No. 4:09CV804–DJS, 2010 WL 582590, at *4 (E.D. Mo., Feb. 
18, 2010).   
 171  See 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)–(b) (2012).   
 172  Id. § 7703(b)(1)(A). 
 173  See id. (“Except as provided in subparagraph (B) and paragraph (2) of this subsection, a petition 
to review a final order or final decision of the Board shall be filed in the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit.”).   
 174  See id. § 7703(b)(2) (“Cases of discrimination subject to the provisions of section 7702 of this 
title shall be filed under section 717(c) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e–16(c)), section 
15(c) of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (29 U.S.C. 633a(c)), and section 16(b) of 
the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended (29 U.S.C. 216(b)), as applicable.”).  This language 
cross-references the filing requirements for rights of action under Title VII, the ADEA, and the FLSA, 
all of which confer original subject matter jurisdiction on the federal district courts.   
 175  Kloeckner, 133 S. Ct. at 604.   
 176  Id. at 605. 
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MSPB on procedural grounds,177 but in the grand scheme of employment 
litigation, it was of little significance. 
So, the Court decided eight cases touching and concerning labor and 
employment.  One of these cases was of so little consequence that it is 
difficult to draw any lessons from it other than that statutes mean what they 
say.  The other seven, I will contend in the next Part, served an interest in 
procedural predictability, and did so to the great benefit of employers as 
repeat players in the employment dispute resolution system.   
III. PROCEDURAL PREDICTABILITY AND EMPLOYERS AS REPEAT PLAYERS 
As descriptive theory of the Court’s OT 2012 work, and as a 
complement to the existing accounts of the Roberts Court’s jurisprudence in 
labor, employment, and business litigation,178 I seek in this Part to outline 
what I see as a governing principle for the Court’s working majorities in OT 
2012.  I call this principle “procedural predictability.”  This Part will show 
that a concern for procedural predictability—defined as the ability to know 
at the earliest stage possible at what stage a dispute will resolve, and what it 
will cost to resolve that dispute—animated almost all of the Court’s OT 
2012 decisions.  Further, the application of this principle overwhelmingly 
favored employers as repeat players in the employment dispute resolution 
system, regardless of whether the employer- or employee-side party 
prevailed in each case before the Court.   
Legal formalists such as Justice Antonin Scalia have long extolled the 
virtues of “a law of rules,” or the setting down of bright-line rules of 
decision to guide legal actors.179  Most such accounts defend formalist rule 
development in part as protecting legal actors from uncertainty by fostering 
                                                                                                                           
 
 177  It is plausible that the federal government, in its role as a repeat player in the system of 
employment dispute resolution, lost both the immediate decision in Kloeckner and the long-term 
benefits associated with the position it took in the case.  Most plausibly, forcing all purely procedural-
based, mixed case MSPB decisions for review into the Federal Circuit could have saved the Government 
some time and expense associated with litigating cases in local district courts, but the time and expense 
saved, if any, would not likely be very great, especially considering that all merits-based, mixed case 
MSPB decisions would still have to be reviewed in the local federal district courts.  See supra notes 
156–77 and accompanying text (discussing the Kloeckner decision).   
 178  E.g., Bodie, supra note 3; Robin S. Conrad, The Roberts Court and the Myth of a Pro-Business 
Bias, 49 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 997 (2009); Lee Epstein, William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, How 
Business Fares in the Supreme Court, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1431 (2013); David L. Franklin, What Kind of 
Business-Friendly Court?: Explaining the Chamber of Commerce’s Success at the Roberts Court, 49 
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1019 (2009). 
 179  E.g., Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1179 (1989) 
(introducing predictability as a justification for a rule-based jurisprudence: “Even in simpler times 
uncertainty has been regarded as incompatible with the Rule of Law.  Rudimentary justice requires that 
those subject to the law must have the means of knowing what it prescribes.”).    
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predictability in the law.180  The sort of predictability that is most often the 
subject of these accounts is the predictability that legal actors enjoy in 
ordering their affairs outside the litigation context—what Justice Harlan 
called “primary conduct.”181  The constitutional doctrine of vagueness as a 
means of voiding statutes operationalizes this concern for predictability by 
requiring that statutes allow a person of ordinary intelligence to be able to 
discern what conduct they require or proscribe.182  In employment law, 
common law doctrines such as the now-disfavored “fellow servant” rule 
have attempted to serve this same interest in predictability in ordering one’s 
daily affairs.183   
In the Court’s recent labor and employment decisions, however, a 
different concern for predictability is at work.  The Court does not attempt 
to clarify duties and rights under the law so that employers and employees 
will know how to act toward one another in the workplace, or so that they 
know what to expect from each other.  Rather, the Court seems much more 
concerned with formulating and clarifying rules of decision, so that 
employers will know, at an early stage in each case, whether they will be 
likely to win or not, how long it will take to win, and how much it will cost 
to litigate to a resolution.  The cases therefore evidence a strong preference 
in the Court’s majorities for simplifying and shortening employment cases, 
and little interest in tampering with the substantive duties and rights the 
underlying claims advance.   
To be sure, the individual outcomes of the remaining OT 2012 cases 
favored the employer parties by almost a two-to-one margin.  Employer-
side litigants won five of the eight cases reviewed above (Italian Colors, 
Nitro-Lift, Vance, Nassar, and Symczyk), but the employee-litigants won the 
other three (Sutter, McCutchen, and Kloeckner).  And, excluding Kloeckner 
(as either neutral or only speculatively harmful to the federal government as 
an employer), the long-term litigation interests of employers as repeat 
players in the employment dispute resolution system were favored in every 
case.  In each case, the Court, either explicitly in its reasoning or implicitly 
in the rules it adopted, pursued a greater level of procedural predictability 
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for employer-litigators.  A close look at the cases will illustrate how this 
occurred.  I begin with the contract cases.   
A. Procedural Predictability in the Contract Cases 
The Court pursued procedural predictability in its contract cases not by 
uniformly deciding such cases in favor of the employer-side parties.184  In 
fact, half of the four contract drafting cases were decided in favor of the 
employee-side litigants.185  Rather, the Court pursued procedural 
predictability by illustrating through the opinion in each case contract 
drafting strategies that, if employed, would have the effect of reducing the 
costs for employers in future litigation.   
Beginning with McCutchen, the Court’s lone ERISA case, recall that 
the employee prevailed on his argument that principles of equity demanded 
that his litigation costs be shared proportionally between the Plan and 
him.186  A close look at the Court’s opinion, however, reveals that 
McCutchen’s victory masked a more important victory for employers (in 
this case the employer as benefits plan administrator) as repeat players.  
McCutchen’s success at having the common fund doctrine applied to his 
litigation costs depended on the majority’s conclusion that the Plan was 
“silent” as to the allocation of such costs.187  As to the Plan’s right to 
reimbursement itself, the Court unanimously applied the explicit terms of 
the Plan, even where such application had the effect of taking money out of 
McCutchen’s own pocket.188    
Because a majority of the Court found (contrary to the parties’ 
stipulation that the Plan was unambiguous) that the Plan was “silent” as to 
allocation of litigation costs, McCutchen was able to overcome the Plan’s 
harsh explicit language regarding reimbursement.189  But the decision sends 
a very clear signal to employers.  If employers and benefit plan 
administrators want to recover their expenses on covered health items out of 
the proceeds of the insured’s litigation without having to assume a 
proportional share of the expenses, all they need do is draft the plan so that 
it is not “silent” as to the allocation of such expenses.  In other words, the 
unanimous portion of the Court’s decision stands for the proposition that 
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the Court will apply the explicit language of an ERISA plan, even if 
applying such language as written works a grave injustice on the insured,190 
and the non-unanimous portion applying equity depends on the conclusion 
that the Plan is silent, and therefore ambiguous, on an important term.191   
Considering this unanimous holding in light of the majority’s finding 
that the Plan was “silent” about the allocation of costs, then, the message to 
employers is clear—draft your plans with clear allocation-of-costs 
provisions, and they will be enforced as written, regardless of the injustice 
that may result to the insured employees.192  Thus, in handing an equity-
based victory to McCutchen, the Court pointed the way for employers and 
benefit plan administrators to manage their litigation costs and increase the 
predictability of their ultimate success when they must sue their covered 
employees for reimbursement.  The Court did this in one way or another in 
all of its contract cases in OT 2012.  The remaining cases of this type all 
involved arbitration contracts, but each case in one way or another served 
the interests in procedural predictability held by employers as repeat players 
in the employment dispute resolution system.   
Sutter’s resolution of a thorny issue created by a recent Supreme Court 
arbitration decision redounds to the benefit of employers as repeat players.  
Recall that the Court held in Stolt-Nielson that the parties to an arbitration 
agreement must specifically agree to permit class arbitration in order for the 
plaintiff to proceed on behalf of others in an arbitration.193  Under Sutter, 
the rule of “specific agreement” set forth in Stolt-Nielson was clarified—
“specifically” does not necessarily mean “explicitly.”194  The rule of Sutter 
requires only that the parties’ agreement can be interpreted to allow for 
class arbitration, not that the agreement contain a specific provision 
explicitly permitting class arbitration.195   
Employers, therefore, may not count on the absence of any language in 
the agreement relating to class treatment to prevent class arbitration.  
Rather, to avoid class arbitration, employers must include a provision in the 
arbitration agreement stating that the parties have not come to terms on 
class arbitration, or that no portion of the agreement should be read to 
authorize class arbitration, or even more certainly, that class arbitration is 
not permitted under the agreement.   
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Thus, although the arbitrator’s interpretation of the parties’ agreement 
to allow for class arbitration was upheld under the specific facts of the 
Sutter case, the Court illuminated a clear path for employers to avoid the 
same result in all future cases.  Given the well-known imbalance in 
negotiating power between employers and employees,196 it is a virtual 
certainty that employment agreements and employment handbooks around 
the country will be amended as a result of Sutter to include explicit 
language prohibiting class arbitration, and that class arbitration in the 
employment context will become a thing of the past.  In terms of 
employers’ interests in procedural predictability, then, the Sutter decision 
constitutes another long-term victory, even though the employer-party lost 
the case.   
In Italian Colors, where no employer or employees were even parties 
standing in those roles, the interests of employers as repeat players also 
prevailed.  The rule the Court adopted—that enforcing a class arbitration 
prohibition even where individual litigation is cost-prohibitive does not 
prevent the “effective vindication of a federal statutory right”197—will 
greatly benefit employers as repeat players.  Under Italian Colors, most 
employees’ “effective vindication” arguments will fail unless employers 
overreach and seek to secure prospective waivers of employees’ statutory 
rights or impose confiscatory fees.198   
Read together, then, Sutter and Italian Colors create a very robust 
protection for explicit provisions in employment agreements prohibiting 
class arbitration.  It seems that such provisions will be enforced as written, 
even where they appear to leave employees with largely illusory rights to 
litigate individually.  Thus, employers’ interests in procedural predictability 
are now under the employers’ own protection—they need only draft their 
class arbitration prohibitions carefully and explicitly, and they will be able 
to avoid litigating in the aggregate.   
The Court’s unanimous rejection in Nitro-Lift of a state court’s public 
policy-based exception to the rule that the arbitrator decides all issues of 
enforceability, save those regarding enforceability of the arbitration 
provision itself, only reinforces this system of alternative dispute resolution 
that affords employers significant control over their litigation costs.199  All 
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employers must do now is adjust their drafting practices, and they will be 
able to secure the arbitrability of their substantive agreements, to forestall 
the most expensive and protracted litigation against them in the arbitration 
system—class arbitration, and to know at the earliest stage in the process 
whether they will be able to avoid such protraction.   
B. Procedural Predictability in the Statutory Interpretation Cases 
 Although the Court’s service of employers’ interests in procedural 
predictability is most evident in the results of the contract cases, the rules of 
decision that the Court formulated in its statutory interpretation cases also 
served these interests, albeit in different ways.  Beginning with Vance and 
Nassar, not only did the employers in those cases prevail in the cases 
themselves, but they also secured a significant victory in each case for 
employers in general as repeat players.  In Vance, the University escaped 
having to bear a burden of proof as to the Faragher-Ellerth affirmative 
defense against its employee’s claim by winning on the issue of defining 
who is a supervisor for the purposes of the defense.200  More importantly, 
though, the University benefitted its own interests as a repeat player in the 
system of employment dispute resolution, as well as the similar interests of 
other employers, by securing not only a narrow definition of “supervisor,” 
but also a bright-line, formalistic one.201   
Recall that both Vance herself and the EEOC favored a fact-intensive, 
case-by-case approach to who is a supervisor for the purposes of the 
defense.202  But the Court essentially reduced the inquiry to the job 
description: Did the employee in question have the power to hire, fire, 
reassign, or alter salary or benefits?203  Going forward, this means that, if an 
employer pays careful attention to the authority that each employee 
possesses in relation to other employees, it will know at the earliest stage of 
every hostile work environment case whether it will have to prove the 
affirmative defense, or whether it will be able to prevail by simply 
challenging the plaintiff’s proof of the University’s negligence in 
responding to harassment.204  Such knowledge enhances the predictability 
of the costs and duration of the suit, and accordingly makes settlement 
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determinations much easier, much earlier.205  It goes without saying that 
discovery will also be less expensive in such cases if employers no longer 
have to gather information on the case-specific facts surrounding the 
relationship between the plaintiff and the alleged harasser.206   
The Court’s reasoning in Vance suggests that enhancing procedural 
predictability for employers was one of the Court’s goals.207  In justifying 
the adoption of the formalistic, bright-line inquiry for who is a supervisor, 
Justice Alito reasoned as follows:  
The interpretation of the concept of a supervisor that we adopt today is 
one that can be readily applied.  In a great many cases, it will be known 
even before litigation is commenced whether an alleged harasser was a 
supervisor, and in others, the alleged harasser’s status will become clear to 
both sides after discovery.  And once this is known, the parties will be in a 
position to assess the strength of a case and to explore the possibility of 
resolving the dispute.  Where this does not occur, supervisor status will 
generally be capable of resolution at summary judgment.  By contrast, 
under the approach advocated by petitioner and the EEOC, supervisor 
status would very often be murky—as this case well illustrates.208 
These concerns for procedural predictability trumped functionalist 
concerns that a person who does not bear the title of supervisor, or who 
does not have the immediate power to hire, fire, promote, demote, or 
change salary or benefits, may nevertheless have a significant amount of 
supervisory authority stopping short of those powers.  Such authority might 
enable—or assist—such an employee in creating an abusive working 
environment for a co-employee, even absent the threat of an ultimate 
employment action.209   
The majority, confronted with these concerns, criticized the 
functionalist alternative as insufficiently determinative.210  A particularly 
good illustration of the majority’s hostility to a more open-ended approach 
is its criticism of the Government’s attorney—who argued before the Court 
in favor of the EEOC’s functionalist test—for being unable to specify, ex 
ante, the percentage of an employee’s daily work that would have to be 
made up of activities directed by a co-employee for that co-employee to be 
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deemed a supervisor.211  In essence, then, the majority used a formalist 
standard—that of procedural predictability—to evaluate the Government’s 
functionalist test, and found it wanting.212  Vance will not protect employers 
from being sued for hostile work environment harassment under Title 
VII.213 But as a result of the Vance decision, employers as repeat players 
have a simple way of determining early in the dispute resolution process 
whether to settle a hostile work environment suit—simply look at the 
allegedly harassing employee’s job description.   
Nassar also secured a long-term victory for employers as repeat 
players, and it grounded its decision on a similar justification based on the 
desirability of procedural predictability.214  Recall that, in Nassar, the issue 
was whether the “mixed motive” framework of Title VII’s anti-
discrimination provisions applies to retaliation claims, and the University 
employer won the appeal on that issue, meaning that Dr. Nassar would have 
to prove his retaliation claim using the normal “but for” causation 
framework.215  This ruling will have immediate effects in the workplace, as 
it will now be less risky to discipline or terminate an employee who may 
have engaged in protected activity while at the same time violating some 
employer policy that would itself have justified the discipline or 
termination.  But this decreased risk will not, by itself, prevent lawsuits 
against employers, and plaintiffs will still be able to win such lawsuits 
where they can prove that, despite the plaintiff’s other conduct, the 
employer would not have taken the challenged action absent a retaliatory 
motive.216   
Nevertheless, the rule of Nassar serves the interests of employers as 
repeat players in such litigation because it removes a great deal of 
uncertainty from the process of a retaliation case at a very early stage in the 
process.  Under the rule of Nassar, all employers know from the outset that 
plaintiffs will have to meet the burden of proving that any justification the 
employer offers for an allegedly retaliatory employment decision is 
pretextual.217  A mixed motive theory allows the plaintiff to concede the 
legitimacy of the employer’s proffered reason and go on to show that 
retaliation was also the employer’s motive, forcing the employer to then 
prove that it would have made the same decision even absent the retaliatory 
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motive to avoid having to pay damages.218  But the Nassar rule reverses this 
set of burdens.  Under Nassar, the employer will escape liability unless the 
employee proves that the employer would not have made the same decision 
absent the retaliatory motive.219  Knowing this at the outset, employers can 
adjust their discovery plans with an eye toward establishing the legitimate 
reason for a decision and preventing the plaintiff from proving that it was 
not the real reason (or even from proving that it was not one reason among 
several), without having to worry about the employee ever shifting the 
burden to them.   
As it was in Vance, this concern for providing employers with 
procedural predictability was an explicit justification for the Court’s 
decision.220  In justifying the decision, Justice Kennedy first focused on the 
recent increases in retaliation claims under Title VII, pointing out that such 
claims are now second only to race claims in terms of their frequency.221  
Justice Kennedy then posited that a less demanding causation standard 
would “contribute to the filing of frivolous claims,” citing a hypothetical 
vignette of a bad employee who, knowing that he or she is about to be 
disciplined, makes “an unfounded charge of racial, sexual, or religious 
discrimination” to manufacture a retaliation claim.222   
Justice Kennedy’s vignette is somewhat dubious as an argument that 
such frivolous claims will survive to the later stages of a suit (i.e., past the 
summary judgment phase), considering the well-established rule that an 
employer need not forego a planned action against an employee simply 
because the employee has engaged in protected conduct since the decision 
to take such action was made.223  Nevertheless, Justice Kennedy conceded 
only that the employer in such a situation “could escape judgment after 
trial,” and he expressed concern that employing the motivating factor 
standard of causation would make it more difficult for the employer to 
dispose of the case at summary judgment.224  Justice Kennedy further 
reasoned that “[i]t would be inconsistent with the structure and operation of 
Title VII to so raise the costs, both financial and reputational, on an 
employer whose actions were not in fact the result of any discriminatory or 
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retaliatory intent.”225  As in Vance, therefore, the Court’s concern was not 
that the employers be protected from suit per se, but that suits against them 
be resolved as quickly and cheaply as possible.226  These concerns, and the 
rule that the Court adopted in service of them, sound in procedural 
predictability—the knowledge, at the earliest stage of the case, of how the 
case will come out and how much time and money it will take to get to that 
result.   
The Court’s other major statutory interpretation case, Symczyk, served 
these same interests in procedural predictability, albeit without employing 
the explicit justifications found in Vance and Nassar.  Recall that Symczyk 
involved the increasingly common practice of an employer using a formal 
settlement offer to “pick off” the named plaintiff in a putative collective 
action under the FLSA before other employees are able to opt into the 
suit.227  The Court held only that, once the named plaintiff is “picked off,” 
the collective action becomes moot if no other employee has opted in yet.228 
The benefits of the “pick-off” strategy are obvious.  If the named 
plaintiffs in collective actions can be picked off one by one before a class 
can form, an employer can simultaneously accomplish two objectives.  
First, the employer can prevent a putative collective action from becoming a 
true collective action, and thereby prevent a small, inexpensive case from 
becoming a large, expensive one.229  Second, the employer can prevent the 
employee class from securing the normal efficiencies and economies of 
class aggregation, thus making each individual claim more costly, on a per-
claim basis, to litigate.230  As discussed above in the context of class 
arbitration prohibitions, making each claim more costly to litigate can also 
have the effect of preventing claims from ever being filed.231   
In any event, knowing at the outset of a putative collective action that 
the aggregation of claims can be prevented by picking off the named 
plaintiff serves the employer’s interests in procedural predictability. 
Moreover, knowing that, even if an Offer of Judgment is not accepted, the 
same result will be obtained, as long as the Offer is for all of the relief the 
plaintiff seeks, further serves the employer’s interests in predictability.232  
Thus, for employers as repeat players in the employment dispute resolution 
system, the most desirable outcome for the Symczyk case would have been 
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for the Court to endorse the decision of the Third Circuit holding that an 
unaccepted Offer of Judgment for all of the relief the plaintiff seeks moots 
the plaintiff’s individual claim,233 which then moots the entire putative 
collective action.  The least desirable outcome would have been for the 
Court to explicitly reject the Third Circuit’s rule on mooting the 
individual’s claim, which would have had the effect of reversing its ruling 
on mooting the collective action.   
The Court took a path between these options that, on balance, favored 
the interests of employers as repeat players.  By assuming the mootness of 
Symczyk’s claim and holding that mooting her claim mooted the putative 
collective action,234 the Court preserved the (imperfect, but real) procedural 
predictability that prevailed under the Third Circuit’s opinion, without 
explicitly endorsing the rule that the individual’s claim is mooted through 
her failure to accept the employer’s Offer of Judgment.235   
As Justice Kagan pointed out in her colorful and humorous dissent, a 
case with such an important element abandoned or waived is not likely to 
come before the Court again, so the effect of the Court’s decision in 
establishing a durable principle of mootness is likely to be minimal at 
best.236  But in preserving the most important parts of the status quo, and 
enabling such preservation through the clever use of the Court’s “assume 
without deciding” power,237 the majority preserved the “pick off” device as 
a way for employers to manage their litigation exposure at the outset of an 
FLSA case, at least until the Third Circuit’s individual mootness rule comes 
before the Court properly.  By preserving this device, the Court in Symczyk 
preserved the ability of employers to manage the procedural predictability 
of their own cases.   
IV. CONCLUSION 
I have sought through this brief review of the Court’s OT 2012 labor 
and employment-related cases to identify a principle that animated the 
Court’s decisions.  That principle is procedural predictability for employers, 
a principle that, as applied in the OT 2012 cases, assists employers as repeat 
players in the employment dispute resolution system by allowing them to 
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understand and manage their likely costs in the early stages of an 
employment dispute.   
The general idea of predictability in the law animates any formalist 
jurisprudence.238  Chief Justice Roberts’s statement at his confirmation 
hearing comparing judging to umpiring was interpreted by many as staking 
a claim to formalist judging,239 and it has generated some interest and 
commentary as to the Court’s formalist tendencies.240  To date, none of this 
work has focused on procedural predictability, as I have defined it, as a 
feature of the Court’s ostensible formalism.  It would therefore be worth 
examining the Roberts Court’s entire work product in the area of labor and 
employment, or perhaps in the general area of business litigation, to see 
whether the procedural form of predictability identified here exerts the 
normative force in that body of work that it exerted in the Court’s OT 2012 
labor and employment-related cases.   
This Article has begun what will likely be an ongoing inquiry by 
defining the principle, identifying the ways in which the Court pursued it in 
the most recent term, and outlining the benefits that it affords employers as 
repeat players in the employment dispute resolution system.   
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